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Abstract 
Using traditional health capital model of Grossman (1972) and Wagstaff (1986
a
) this paper 
attempts to fill in the theoretical missing link between mothers’ autonomy and household 
consumption behavior, particularly focusing on the consumption of child health inputs. It has 
been shown in this analysis that working mothers’ children should be of better health status. 
Further independent of working status of the mother, the autonomy parameter always induces 
consumption of more health inputs for the children. However, when autonomy is linked with 
mothers’ income, the basic results of the model are further strengthened. In fact, income 
induced autonomy may result in redefining the composite consumption good for the family as 
an inferior one.     
 
 
Key words:  mothers’ autonomy, child health, health demand, behavioral factors 
JEL classification: D1,I12, I18, D11. 
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Introduction 
The importance of mothers’ role in family decision-making that impacts the health, 
nutrition and overall wellbeing of their children is quite evident from the literature on gender 
and development studiesin developing countries (Caldwell (1986); Hossain et al. (2007); 
Brunson,Shell-Duncan&Steele (2009), World Bank (2003)).In the context of child health, such 
autonomy or empowerment of the mother translates to decisions regarding demand for diets, 
medical careand other health inputs which are primarily needed to improve or maintain the 
health stock of the child, increase life expectancy, decrease morbidity etc. Although the 
definition and measurement of female autonomy itself has been a debated issue,
1
many 
empirical studies- either directly or indirectly - have established the fact that women with more 
freedom to control household resources positively affect child health (Caldwell(1986); Hossain 
et al.(2007); World Bank (2003); Miles-Doan and Bisharat (1990); Brunson, Shell-Duncan, & 
Steele (2009)). The aim of this paper is to theoretically study the mechanism through which 
greater autonomy of the mother translates to better child health. Since the topics of gender 
equality, women’s empowerment have been addressed largely in the context of developing 
countries, the objective and implications of our research are mostly applicable in the context of 
developing nations as well. For brevity, we employ a simple modeling methodology and abstain 
from any inherent bargaining mechanism between husband and wife that affects intra-
household resource allocation in determining female autonomy, which has been a cornerstone 
of some theoretical studies (see for example, Anderson & Eswaran (2009);Doepke & Tertilt 
(2011)). Our model focuses on the inherent trade-off that a mother faces in redistributing 
limited family financial resources between child health-related inputs and other goods and 
services in the family budget. 
This paper is along the lines of health capital models of Grossman (1972, 1999) and 
Wagstaff (1986
a
, 1986
b
). Following this literature,we assert that a representative individual or 
family includes child health in addition to consumable goods and servicesin the utility function. 
But child health itself is a produced input, whereas other elements of utility can be directly 
                                                          
1
 Mason (1986), Dyson and Moore (1983) elucidate the conceptual underpinnings of female autonomy.  
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purchased from the market. We also assume that the mother’s autonomy parameter takes 
away some finances from the family budget constraint in favor of child health inputs. 
Consequently, the effects of changes in the degree of autonomy and money income are 
explored under two different situations and for two different groups of mothers i.e. working 
and non-working mothers. We examine two different setups: (i)when autonomy is exogenous
2
 
andindependent of money income earned by the mother (in case of working mothers), and 
(ii)when mother’s autonomy is endogenously determined by the income earned by her. The 
second situation obviously applies only to working mothers.
3
 
In this backdrop we derive some basic results: earning mothers’ children should have better 
health; autonomy always increases the consumption of child health inputs; incremental 
changes for health inputs due to increase in mother’s autonomy are higher for working 
mothers; consumption of composite good may fall even after increase in mother’sincome when 
mother’s autonomy depends on her income –composite good may become an inferior one. 
Model Environment and the Basic Model 
Irrespective of the type and nature of the representative individual or family, one derives 
satisfaction from two sources: child health and consumption of the composite good. Here 
consumption itself includes the health of the representative individual.
4
 Following Grossman 
(1972) and Wagstaff (1986
a
, 1986
b
) we slightly modify the utility function of the representative 
individual in such a way that child health, which itself is a produced input, enters into the utility 
function, since a healthy baby probably gives significant amount of satisfaction to the parents. 
We assume that children are endowed with some initial stock of health, although such health 
stockis exogenous to our analysis. Therefore, we have two different objective functions: one is 
                                                          
2
 This can be thought of as a situation when mother’s autonomy in family decision making depends on her 
education level, social norms, her mobility outside the household etc. Such factors that impact the association 
between mother’s autonomy and child health have been empirically corroborated by Chakrabarti (2012), Basu and 
Stephenson (2005), Miller & Rodgers (2009), Frost, Forste& Haas (2005), etc.   
3
 Empirical research documenting links between female earning and female autonomy, mothers’ income and child 
health, income-induced autonomy of mother on child health can be found in studies such as Mason (1986), Engle 
(1993), Kishor (1993), Rahman & Rao (2004), Anderson & Eswaran (2009). 
4
 We use “individual” and “family” interchangeably to denote the same thing. We do this intentionally as the 
motto of the individual and family are identical, at least in our case.  
 
5 
 
the family utility function and the other one is the child health production function. The 
representative family or individual allocatesresources among different health inputs for child 
health and the composite good. 
The utility function representing an individual’s preferences is given by, 
 =   , 	         (1) 
 is increasing in both arguments and quasi-concave.  represents health status of the child, 
which is essentially a produced input that yields satisfaction to the individual and indicates a 
composite commodity including parents’ own health. Therefore, the representative individual is 
faced with the problem of production of   and the consumption of. Although the use of a 
single utility function representative of the whole family -following Becker (1981) - is not 
beyond criticism (see McElroy & Horney (1981); Chiappori (1988, 1992); Browning &Chiappori 
(1998)), this function is extremely popular for its applicability and elegance. 
To ensure tractability, we represent the individual utility function using a Cobb-Douglas 
form as shown below. 
 = 
		          (2) 
We incorporate mothers’ autonomy or the degree of empowerment in the utility function by 
making the parameters of the utility function dependent on mother’s autonomy coefficient  
such that 0 ≤  < 1.Specifically,γ = γα	andδ = δα	 where 0 < γα	 < 1 and 0 < δα	 <1 are the utility elasticities with respect to and , respectively.  
Assumption 1: ′	>0 and′	<0 
 Although the mother derives utility from both child health and consumption of other goods 
and services, we assume that with an increase in autonomy power, the mother prioritizes child 
6 
 
health over the composite good when faced with resource allocation trade-off between these 
two items at the margin.
5
 
  is defined by the following health production function. 
 =  	; !" > 0       (3)6 
 is the consumption of food, medical care and other things by the child. Price of  is given 
by#".7If the health production function is Cobb-Douglas type then we have, 
 = $          (4) 
where 0 < % < 1 is the elasticity of   with respect to . 
The representative individual is constrained by family income earned by both the father and 
mother together. Mother’s income is denoted by &8 and father’s income is given by (.9 
Assumption 2: ( > 0and& ≥ 0. 
& ≥ 0captures both working and non-working mothers in terms of their earnings.10Being a 
working mother does not guarantee that a significant part of family income, in general, and the 
                                                          
5
 Empirical studies such as Thomas (1990), Bruce, Lloyd & Leonard (1995), Blumberg (1991)suggest that families 
where women have a stronger say in decision making tend to devote a higher proportion of family resources to 
children compared to those where women play a less decisive role. 
6
 We do not include the child’s initial stock of health i.e. * in our health production function. In a more extensive 
version of the model i.e.  =  , *	such initial stock of health *would be endogenous and will depend on 
several factors such as prenatal care, access to health facilities, food habit of the mother, genetic problems etc. We 
ignore all these factors for brevity. 
7
 Although we implicitly assume that child care is included in the variable , for a more complete representation 
one can explicitly include a child care variable +in the health production function i.e.  =  , +	. In that case 
some necessary level of child care +,might be provided by mother such that + > +, > 0,while the rest can be 
purchased in the market. For our current paper this segregation of inputs does not change the basic results of the 
model. Also, note that for child care provided by the mother, the price of care #-then represents the imputed cost 
of care. 
8
 M defines mother’s income from working outside the home. 
9
 Note that father’s income can be thought of as being composed of two components: (and(.̅ , where some part 
of father’s income, ( , is always spent on child health. This also ensures that in the extreme case if mother’s 
autonomy parameter converges to zero,  does not fall to zero. (.̅defines the remaining part of father’s income 
which could be used either for  or , depending on the value of . 
10
 We are aware that this assumption undermines the mothers who sacrifice their personal happiness, professional 
career, etc. for child rearing and doing household chores. One could have thought of imputing costs for such work, 
but we have refrained ourselves from delving into such issues. 
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mother’s income, in particular, would be spent on. This depends on the autonomy power of 
the mother. Non-zero but less than unitary value of  indicates the fraction of money from the 
family budget the mother can allocate or re-allocate for child’s health. Even if& = 0,  may not 
be zero. This happens in many families where professionally qualified mothers opt not to work 
outside of home in order to take care of their children. Therefore,for any given value of & ≥0, a low value of  indicates more consumption of  and less of , and conversely.11 So, the 
budget constraint becomes, 
P" + P2 = & + (      (5)12 
The utility maximization problem of the representative family can be then written as, 
3 max",2  =  
		subject to  = $ and #" + #2 = & + (>   (6) 
Results 
We solve for the equilibrium values of and for both working and non-working mothers 
using the Lagrangian method of constrained optimization. Employing the first order condition 
for maximizing and we get, 
3∗ = $@ABC	DEB$@	∗ = ABC	DFB$@	G       (7) 
and, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
11
 Since we do not focus on determining, we assume it as given. depends on lot of factors including bargaining 
power, education, social systems, religious beliefs, etc. So, in our analysis  takes the form of a composite index 
that is comprised of education, awareness, mobility, decision making power, etc. that helps the mother to control 
a larger pie of the household income. 
12
 Note that the budget constraint can be alternatively re-arranged as#" + #2 = ( + (.̅ + &	 +(.̅ + &	1 − 	. This clearly depicts how mother’s autonomy parameter captures the distribution of family 
income between   and . However, we are not using such a budget constraint in order to avoid any in-built 
distributional bias that might occur against the composite consumption good with an increasing value of. 
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3I∗ = $@CDEB$@	I∗ = CDFB$@	G       (8) 
∗ and ∗denote the equilibrium values for working mothers and I∗ , I∗  stand for the same 
for non-working mothers - for whom & = 0. 
Subtracting equation (8) from (7) we get,J∗ − I∗ K = $@ADEB$@	 > 0. This result is quite 
apparent since for working mothers the disposable income is higher vis-à-vis their non-working 
counterparts which leadsto more resource allocation towards child health inputs. Therefore, 
health status of children of working mothers must be better than those of non-working 
mothers. Thus the following proposition is immediate. 
PROPOSITION I: For given ,  for working mother is greater than that of non-working mother 
as
 !" > 0. 
Proof: See discussion above.        ∎ 
Now, let us move to the changes in equilibrium value of owing to any change in and &in 
order to explore how changes in autonomy power and income of mother affect child health. 
3"∗ = CBA	$@MN@M	DEB$@	O > 0"∗A = $@DEB$@	 > 0 G     (9) 
and, 
"P∗ = C$@MN@M	DEB$@	O > 0     (10) 
Thus, we propose that, 
PROPOSITION II: Irrespective of whether the mother is working or not, an increase in  raises 
  as"∗ , "P∗ > 0. 
Proof: See equations (9) and (10) above.       ∎ 
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Lemma II.1:Incremental change in  due to an increase in  is higher for working mothers. 
Proof:   Q"∗ − "P∗ R = A$@MN@M	DEB$@	O > 0, since S	 < 0. 
∎ 
So far we have not attempted to examine the effects on . Differentiating the expressions 
for ∗and I∗ w.r.t. and &, we get the following:  
32∗ = CBA	$@MN@M	DFB$@	O < 02∗A = DFB$@	 > 0 G     (11) 
and,  
2P∗ = C$@MN@M	DFB$@	O < 0      (12)13 
So, we arrive at the following proposition. 
PROPOSITION III: A rise in autonomy, , redistributes expenditure against  or in favor of .      
Proof: See equations (11) and (12) above.      ∎  
Extended Model 
In this segment we modify the basic model described earlier in such a way that  is no 
longer exogenously given. In the previous section  was considered as a proxy for all variables 
controlled by the mother; here mothers’ autonomy depends on her income. So,  is redefined 
as 
 = &	;   1 > S > 0      (13) 
 is a monotonically increasing function of & with the inequality condition of 0 ≤  < 1. A 
zero & implies zero autonomy power, i.e  = 0 if   & = 0.  So,  solely depends on the amount 
                                                          
13induces positive income effect for  only. But & does the same for all the goods. So,  may be regarded as an 
“inferior good” for any change in autonomy.  
10 
 
of money the mother earns. Therefore, this section, in a sense primarily focuses on the working 
mothers. 
Maximization of utility subject to the health production function and budget constraint 
yields identical demand expressions for  and, as in equation (8), except for the fact that all 
terms with  are now functions of &. Let us denote these new demand expressions as ∗∗and ∗∗.14 
Differentiating ∗∗and  ∗∗with respect to  again and comparing the values with that of (9) 
and (11) one can easily assert that the values of the marginal changes in the consumption of and , respectively due to changes in are the same in the basic and extended models.15 
However, when & changes, we have different results: 
"∗∗A = $@B$@	BCBA	M$@MN@M	DEB$@	O > 0     (14) 
Comparing (14) with similar expression in (9) we find: 
"∗∗A > "∗A    UV δ′W&	X < 0 . 
This leads us to the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION IV: Marginal change in  due to an increase in & is higher when  depends on &. 
            ∎ 
This further explains why   for working mother would be higher when  is determined by 
mothers’ earnings. 
Now, let us turn to the consumption of the composite good. Differentiating  ∗∗with respect 
to &, we have: 
2∗∗A = B$@	BCBA	M$@MN@M	DFB$@	O       (15) 
                                                          
14
 For details see Appendix. 
15
 Refer to Appendix for details.  
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A careful scrutiny of the above expression reveals that
2∗∗A  may take any value, unlike 2∗A  in 
the basic model. In the basic model we had the standard income effect. Whereas, here, the 
income effect is not so straightforward as &helps redistributing budget  more towards both 
directly through( + &	) and indirectly through&	. 
2∗∗A ⋛ 0 Z[[ B$@	M$@MN@M	 ⋛ ( + &	     (16) 
If &\represents some threshold level of mother’s income, then, 
3At & = &
\ , 2∗∗A = 0 ⇔ B$@	M$@MN@M	 = ( + &	For & < &\ , 2∗∗A > 0 ⇔ +%	′%′−′	 > ( + &	For & > &\ , 2∗∗A < 0 ⇔ +%	′%′−′	 < ( + &	 abc
bd 16   (17) 
Based on (17) we can see that for working mothers, a very high income can translate into high 
autonomy power, which, in turn,might result in family consumption of the composite good 
becoming an inferior one. The intuition here is that when & is very high, mother has very high 
autonomy power, &	being high too, to redistribute family consumption substantially more 
towards child health inputs and quite less towards  with increasing &. This makes S become 
so negative i.e. it crosses some threshold level to turn  into an inferior good. Family’s overall 
utility from elevated child health overcompensates any disutility resulting from decreased 
consumption of . Realistically, this situation can be imagined as one when a very high family 
income has already taken care of basic family needs and the family’s net utility from cutting 
down some conspicuous consumption and redistributing resources towards child health inputs 
is positive. Note that S is always negative but in the basic model this threshold level is never 
reached when autonomy is independent of &. Also, when & is zero, this can be viewed as the 
limiting case of & being very small. We have already shown that 2∗∗A > 0 when & is very small 
                                                          
16
When M is very high,  is very high since  is a monotonic increasing function of M. For such a case S is negative 
and large and γS is positive and large. At the same time ′ will be a high positive number as well. This makes the 
denominator SργS − γS	 a very large positive number. So, the fraction in the above expression is a very low 
number and becomes less than (F+M), the latter being a large number because of M being very high. This 
makes
2∗∗A negative. Similar reasoning holds for the case when M is very low and 2
∗∗
A is positive. 
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or when & is close to zero which in the limit converges to the basic model.Thus, we have the 
following proposition: 
PROPOSITION V: Reallocation of expenditure due to change in & may transform  into an 
inferior good with 
2∗∗A < 0.       ∎ 
Conclusion and discussion 
In this paper we have strived to fill in a caveat in the theoretical literature – the mechanism 
through which mothers’ autonomy power translates into better child health, by setting up a 
model of utility maximization and health production following Grossman (1972) and Wagstaff 
(1986
a
). In doing so, we have established that working mothers are more likely to have a 
healthy child as their autonomy redistributes financial resources in favor of child health inputs. 
Autonomy always induces consumption of health inputs for children – this is independent of 
whether the mother works or not. We then extended the basic set up to check what happens if 
mothers’ autonomy depends only on her income. We observed that the results of the basic 
model are further strengthened in the extended model. 
Apart from providing with some empirically testable hypotheses, this model may be 
extended for a case where initial child health endowment is incorporated into the model.If such 
initial health stock differs across children, one can expect different levels of  for identical 
health outcomes for different children. This model can again be reshaped to incorporate the 
issue of distribution of total working hours of the mother between work and child care (for any 
given amount of time for leisure). We believe that this could be an extremely interesting 
exposition as, on the one side, money raises autonomy power and disposable income and, on 
the other hand, it reduces the time devoted for child care. That will possibly enable one to 
explain some empirical irregularities such as children of working mothers are not always of 
better health.
17
The model, we hope, would also be able to capture the phenomenon of a 
backward bending labor supply curve, and how beyond a threshold level of mother’s wage and 
                                                          
17
 See Basu&Basu (1991), Desai & Jain (1994). 
13 
 
income a wage hike would increase child health, whereas for a wage rate less than that, child 
health may display a negative relationship with wage rate. 
14 
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Appendix 
 
In the extended model the optimization problem is  
 
Max U = 
J∝h	KJ∝h	K 
 
subject to  = $and #" + #2 = & + ( 
 
Lagrange method yields the following optimal values 
 
3∗∗ = %J∝ M	K& + (	#"J∝ M	K + %J∝ M	K	∗∗ = J∝ M	K& + (	#2J∝ M	K + %J∝ M	K	abc
bd
 
 
Differentiating ∗∗and  ∗∗with respect to  yields 
 j∗∗j = ( + &	%SJ∝ M	KJ∝ M	K − J∝ M	KSJ∝ M	K	#"J∝ M	K + %J∝ M	K	k > 0 
 j∗∗j = ( + &	%J∝ M	KSJ∝ M	K − SJ∝ M	KJ∝ M	K	#2J∝ M	K + %J∝ M	K	k < 0 
 
 
